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New Under the Sun? Reframing the Gray Zone in International
Security
Abstract
Interstate war has been on the decline since the end of the Second World War. After the
Cold War ended without a grand conflagration, civil conflicts and the war on terrorism have
appeared to displace interstate war as the most pressing loci of security studies. Interstate
aggression has become untenable, some have argued. Cooperative grievance resolution
and the powerful incentives of economic interdependence have produced a decline in the
outbreak of war. Revered scholars of international security have even asked whether we
should bother studying the phenomenon anymore. Intrastate conflicts, it seems, are the
order of the day. We argue that the contraction of interstate war is more a function of the
weight we have accorded 20th century warfare in our conceptualization of interstate war
than a real decrease in states’ willingness to employ force to achieve foreign policy ends. A
broader approach to interstate war is needed to capture a more consistent
conceptualization of the phenomenon. We suggest a framework under which gray zone
strategies represent not an emergent phenomenon but a longstanding set of tools within
the broader phenomenon of interstate conflict.
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Introduction
Despite coming at the end of the deadliest century in recorded history, the
end of the Cold War brought with it much optimism. Nearly a half-century
of superpower competition—which itself only began after two generationshattering, globally calamitous wars—between countries armed with
world-ending arsenals ended not with a bang, but with the implosion of
the Soviet regime. Comparing the end of the Cold War with the end of
WWII, one cannot help but feel that something had changed in the
interim. Indeed, many argue that something has.
Interstate wars have become significantly rarer, replaced in part by civil
wars. Further, when compared to the wars of the first half of the 20th
century the second half’s civil conflicts seemed much more manageable.
Explanations for this purported trend vary, but there appears to be
emerging scholarly consensus that the latter half of the 20th century
marked a dramatic decline in interstate war.1 This consensus accompanies
growing attention to gray zone conflicts as a novel evolution in interstate
competition: An adaptation to a more globalized world with increased
technological capacity and strengthened norms against interstate war.2
This exploratory article questions both assertions.
The authors argue that what appears at face value to be a hopeful marked
decline in interstate conflict is in fact a resurgence of limited engagement
strategies that are not novel to the 21st century. Adopting a broader
framework which accounts for the aggressive strategies found in the gray
zone between peace and outright war suggests more continuity than
decline in incidence of interstate conflict. A growing set of empirical
studies have observed conflict at lower thresholds than traditional
measurement, but so far these conflicts are theoretically underdeveloped.3
This exploratory study seeks to draw out analytical themes common to
several forms of conflict that fall short of the traditional definition of war
and set the stage for further discussion and theory testing. The article
begins with a summary of optimistic interpretations of interstate war’s
apparent decline, followed by a conceptualization of gray zone strategies as
a natural extension of great power politics, seating these within the
broader literatures on power, security, and strategy. The following three
sections focus on three strategies frequently employed in the gray zone
between peace and war, arguing that each is less novel than is commonly
21
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assumed. The final section begins to draw out theoretical implications of
the argument and suggests ways in which future studies may continue to
fill in the gaps in this literature.

At War’s End?
The apparent decline of interstate war has a few possible explanations, but
most point to mounting material and reputational costs of war as a
primary cause. First, realists have long argued that nuclear deterrence
makes the prospect of war with a nuclear state unconscionable.4 Second,
the economic cost makes the notion of wartime gains nonsensical.5 States
have either too much stake in global markets to engage in interstate war or
are too weakened by their isolation to dislodge what Michael Mousseau
calls the pro-status quo “contractualist” hegemony.6 Third, aggressive wars
carry so much normative stigma as to make them untenable.7 Oona
Hathaway and Scott Shapiro argue that this has made international
conflict rare outside of areas where borders are inexactly drawn. Blurry
lines of sovereignty create opportunities for reinterpretation and so escape
the normative (and institutional) backlash associated with aggression.8
Absent these opportunities, conflict becomes unlikely.
Even where states do engage in reinterpretation, the international
community is not without its ability to respond.9 For instance, while
Russia’s position on the UN Security Council prevented the body from
reacting after the invasion of Crimea, several states engaged in what
Hathaway and Shapiro call “outcasting.”10 In this context, it means taking
economic measures meant to impose costs on the perpetrators without
causing the entire economy to collapse. Indeed, this ostracization did not
prevent new cooperative endeavors involving Russia in other realms.11
Hathaway and Shapiro argue that this strategy will eventually convince
Russian leadership to withdraw.
Whatever comes of Russia’s occupation of Crimea, there are reasons to be
skeptical of the claim that a decline in major war is tantamount to a
decline in interstate conflict—or indeed in the use of force in interstate
conflicts. First, the decline in casualties is not necessarily indicative of
diminished aggression. Battle deaths may be poorly suited to measure
violence as medical breakthroughs have dramatically improved
warfighters’ survivability.12 Second, even if major war between states is in
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fact in decline, several means of using coercive force to pursue conflictual
aims remain. The economic, normative, and existential stakes of direct
confrontation do not necessarily apply to activities in the gray zone.
Moreover, far from being new developments, supposedly emergent
categories within the gray zone are often functionally and conceptually
similar to far older forms of belligerence.

Nothing New Under the Sun: Conceptualizing the Gray Zone
Before making the case that gray zone strategies are both commonplace
and well-established practices in interstate competition, a clear
conceptualization of the phenomenon is needed. Javier Jordán provides
an excellent foundation for this, identifying four principal attributes of
gray zone activity: Ambiguity, multidimensionality, asymmetry of
interests, and gradualism.13 Ambiguity refers to the inherent difficulty in
distinguishing gray zone activities from peaceful competition on the one
hand and low-level armed conflict on the other. The concept of
multidimensionality addresses the incorporation of political and social
influence to the traditional diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic instruments of national power, and the synchronous,
coordinated use of multiple instruments to pursue hostile objectives.
Asymmetry of interests highlights tendency of instigators of gray zone
activities to have higher relative interests and resolve than target states,
enabling instigators to leverage targets’ relative disinterest in the dispute
to its advantage. Finally, gradualism refers to the ability of instigators to
calibrate the level of pressure brought to bear to incremental gains just low
enough not to trigger strong responses from their targets.
These attributes allow states to use the instruments of state power to flip
the logic of deterrence and compellence on its head. Dahl conceptualizes
power thus, “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do
something that B would not otherwise do.”14 Yet this formulation gives
little insight into the distinctions between varied uses of power. The
deterrence literature provides additional conceptual traction for
explaining gray zone activities. Art’s taxonomy of military power highlights
three salient uses of power: Defense, deterrence, and compellence.15 Under
normal circumstances, deterrence is the status quo power’s tool. It
leverages the threat of punishment—increased costs intended to offset the
gains of a proposed action—to convince its target not to undertake an

23
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2021

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 14, No. 4

undesirable action. Compellence, on the other hand, must work against
inertia by requiring some change in behavior. Gray zone activities provide
a set of tools for highly motivated revisionist states to flip the incentives of
deterrence and compellence on target states by probing the red lines of
target states.16 By undertaking revisionist behavior while remaining under
a target state’s red lines, a state entering the gray zone “gains the
advantage of inertia and the onus of revision—in this case of revision back
to the status quo ante—shifts to the defender of the status quo.
Furthermore, the status quo power’s task has shifted from deterrence to
the relatively more difficult compellence.”17 This article adopts Jordán’s
definition of gray zone activities as it captures the core logic of the strategy
as well as capturing the ways and means used to achieve the ends for
which a state enters the gray zone.
Within the spectrum of political conflict, the gray zone is
an intermediary space separating competition waged in
accordance with conventional guidelines governing
interstate politics from direct and continued armed
confrontation. Gray zone conflict revolves around an
incompatibility perceived as relevant at least in the eyes of
the aggressor. The strategies used are multidimensional
and synchronized (hybrid), and implementation is
gradual, usually in pursuit of long-term goals.18
In conceptual terms, this logic of leveraging the logic of deterrence to
effect revisions using aggressive actions short of war sets gray zone
activities apart from the two leading terms used to describe interstate
conflict: Armed conflict—a contested difference in preferences resulting in
at least 25 battle deaths each year—and war—an interstate conflict
resulting in at least 1,000 battle deaths in a year. As illustrated above, this
difference is not simply one of degree. Gray zone activities differ in ends,
ways, and means, not to mention fundamental logic. In the terms of the
classical strategists, this suggests that while gray zone activities fit neatly
into the Clausewitzian framework of war as the continuation of “politics by
other means,” they depart from his strategic guidance to identify an
enemy’s center of gravity—primarily its military center of mass or capital—
and concentrate as much force as possible on that point.19 Instead, gray
zone strategies are borne out of Sun Tzu’s dictum that “to win one hundred
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victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the
enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”20
Activities in the gray zone include a range of strategic tools including faits
accomplis, cyberattacks, political disruptions and support for
insurgencies, public influence campaigns, and other attempts to skirt the
established red lines that may lead to war.21 Thus, gray zone activities
represent a sort of “strategic gradualism” which seeks to revise the status
quo while avoiding armed responses from the target.22 Some of the
international relations literature has addressed one form of strategic
rebalancing of the status quo by considering arming as an endogenous tool
for revising the distribution of power between competing states.23 While
this is another form of revision in that it seeks to alter the distribution of
power without provoking a war in response, it is an inherently passive
form of competition that aims to increase the capabilities of the one
undertaking the arming while gray zone strategies take the offensive,
revising not only the distribution of power but their targets’ capabilities,
control of territory, and stability. The following three sections explore
three types of gray zone strategies, conceptualizing the strategies and
arguing that, far from being new phenomena in international politics,
these behaviors are either long-standing tools or continuations of the logic
of other, preexisting, gray zone strategies.
Faits Accomplis
While still understudied, the military fait accompli has of late enjoyed a
surge of interest from international security scholars and professionals.24
As one activity in the gray zone toolbox, the fait accompli seeks to
outmaneuver adversaries in revising the status quo to the instigator’s
benefit while stopping short of crossing red lines that would provoke
armed enforcement of the status quo.25 This forms a halfway point
between peace and war in that faits accomplis almost universally employ
military force to seize territory but are calculated to avoid provoking an
armed response.26 This places the strategy within the broader set of gray
zone activities in that it constitutes a “limited unilateral gain at an
adversary’s expense in an attempt to get away with that gain when the
adversary chooses to relent rather than escalate in retaliation.”27
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Thus, faits accomplis occupy a conceptual liminal space which shares
attributes associated with both coercion and deterrence. In one sense, they
share the coercive logic of employing military power to force a revision to
the status quo, yet unlike classically defined coercion, faits accomplis do
not require any action on the part of the target. Indeed, inaction on the
part of the target is the ideal outcome for the instigator. In this, faits
accomplis share the logic of deterrence, leveraging targets’ reluctance to
fight to disincentivize the use of force to maintain the status quo.28
The fait accompli, then, is a limited unilateral military revision to the
status quo. Though initial faits accomplis are often followed by moves to
consolidate gains, both the initial seizure and subsequent consolidations
are calibrated to avoid provoking war with the target. Therefore, seizures
accompanying or intended to precede open warfare are not instances of
faits accomplis. Nor are ultimatums, since the ultimatum does not
proactively and unilaterally revise the status quo. This definition is
consistent with those used in other recent work on faits accomplis.
However, this definition does raise challenges for each behavior Van Evera
describes as a fait accompli in his discussion of the origins of the First
World War. Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia, Austria’s subsequent
declaration of war against Serbia, and the Central Powers’ planned rapid
victory against Serbia each fail the now-standard definition.29 However,
Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, China’s 2011-present
revisions in the South China Sea, and Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea
all qualify as territorial faits accomplis.30 In each of these cases, the
revisionist state used military force to seize a portion of territory, leaving
would-be defenders of the status quo with the decision to risk escalation in
order to enforce the status quo or allow the revision to stand.
So how common and how new are faits accomplis in interstate land
disputes? Chipman notes with concern the recent rise of gray zone
strategies with special attention to Russian and Chinese faits accomplis,
suggesting that these strategies are relatively new in international
politics.31 However, Altman’s research demonstrated that, contrary to
popular assumption, states have regularly employed faits accomplis to
force revisions to the status quo in territorial disputes since at least the
beginning of the 20th century when his dataset begins. Between 1918 and
2015 states used faits accomplis to seize territory in 105 territorial
disputes, while only using coercive threats in 12 cases.32
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Altman argues this trend has become even starker in the past half century:
“Not once in the last 50 years has a state successfully coerced another into
ceding territory under threat without using its military to seize the
territory first...It is possible to draw the comparison in a variety of ways,
but the bottom line is clear: States gain territory by fait accompli far more
often than by coercion.”33 Not only are faits accomplis more common than
conventional wisdom suggests, they also play a central role in modern
territorial disputes.
Cyberattacks
Cyberattacks have been the subject of angst since cyberspace’s inception.
Fears of cyberspace-predicated disaster scenarios coming to pass have
always been fertile ground for films and television, but blockbuster pitchready cyber threats have also compelled concrete policy change—in 2000,
Japan restricted exports of the then-new PlayStation 2 due to the video
game console’s purported ability to be repurposed in missile guidance
systems.34 Contemporary concerns may not be of a literal game of Missile
Command, but that has not stopped the use of analogy to describe
cyberattacks in the language of kinetic military action.
The SolarWinds data breach in December 2020 was described by
lawmakers at the time as a “virtual invasion,” difficult to distinguish from
an “act of aggression,” and equivalent to “Russian bombers reportedly
flying undetected over the entire country.”35 Given the lack of respect for
cyber warriors among the armed forces and the relatively novel nature of
such an attack,36 this use of analogy is thoroughly understandable,
particularly in light of how applicable some of the strategic insights
gleaned outside of cyberwarfare are to cyberwarfare.37 Moreover, since
then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta issued a warning in 2012 that a
cyberattack aimed at crippling the United States or its military could
resemble a kind of “cyber Pearl Harbor,” such analogizing seems all too
natural.38
Indeed, Emily Goldman and Michael Warner argue that Japan’s pre-WWII
perspective could be helpful as an object lesson when considering
cyberattacks. While ultimately failing to prevent American retaliation, the
attack at Pearl Harbor intended to serve as the establishment of a new
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Japanese sphere of influence. Moreover, a similar logic might inform such
an attack—a risk acceptant power or entity, possibly with a sense of
desperation or that their opportune position may not last terribly long,
preemptively strikes at a materially superior adversary, relying on the
element of surprise to make up the material difference between it and its
target.39
Analogizing cyberattacks is no doubt helpful to stress the importance of
such attacks, but Pearl Harbor served as an inciting incident to total war
while cyberattacks generally reside squarely within the gray zone. Indeed,
cyberattacks generally fall into one of two categories, neither of which are
so kinetic as to constitute open warfare.40 The first such category is an
attack on infrastructure, such as the attack on the Ukrainian electrical grid
in December of 2015 which temporarily cut power to parts of the country
or February 2021’s unsuccessful attempt to poison the water supply in
Florida by hacking a water treatment plant.41 Cyberattacks on
infrastructure also often target data systems, seeking access (or the ability
to tamper with) data or accounts, such as the SolarWinds hack. This data
breach allowed access to sensitive data from several executive departments
and will necessitate painstaking rebuilds of networks and databases
thought to be secure, and so bears more resemblance to the Soviet Union’s
infiltration of the Manhattan Project than the surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor.42
The second category of cyberattack is even further removed from the Pearl
Harbor analogy—operations which undermine a state’s institutions. As an
example, Jarred Prier examines efforts to weaponize social media to
undermine trust in elected officials, news media, and processes such as
immigration or elections themselves.43 Noting the particular successes by
Russian actors, Prier observes that state actors can effectively sow chaos
by providing a message which fits a preferred narrative to a group
predisposed to believe it, having cyber warriors produce material in
support of this narrative (in the form of fake news or data leaks), and
deploying networks of bots designed to spread and normalize the state’s
preferred interpretation thereof via social media, ultimately to create a
trending topic. Prier argues that Russia’s successful efforts to influence
discourse regarding the 2016 elections exposes a troubling vulnerability to
such propaganda campaigns.
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Prier also argues that this is not new. Despite its use by relatively new
actors (such as the Islamic State) and the fact that it is conducted using
relatively novel platforms, Prier argues that Russia’s contemporary
influence campaigns are substantively similar to Cold War-era aktivnyye
meropriyatiya—or active measures—designed to “weave propaganda into
an existing narrative to smear countries or individual candidates.”44
Indeed, Prier relies on Jacques Ellul’s 1965 text on the subject to support
the compatibility of social media to propaganda campaigns due to the
simplicity of both.45 Moreover, Ellul argues that one subjected to a
successful barrage of propaganda experiences a “psychological
crystallization,”46 in which pre-existing suspicions or prejudices harden to
such an extent that evidence that these beliefs may be held in error is
treated as if it were the real propaganda. Put in more contemporary terms,
Ellul observes that someone already open to a propagandist’s message may
be radicalized by such a message to such an extent that confounding
evidence is dismissed as fake news. Cyberattacks may be carried out using
hyper-modern means, but the logic of covertly undermining infrastructure
and institutions of a would-be or potential adversary is anything but new.
Substate and Proxy Conflicts
The end of the Second World War saw a transformation of interstate
conflict. After a half-century that saw unfathomable death and destruction
wrought by the merciless engine of total war, interstate war became less
common, replaced by internal conflicts.47 Many of these conflicts emerged
in the wake of decolonization which saw some former colonial masters
leaving power vacuums or sloppily drawn boundary lines to their former
charges.48 Worse, many of these former colonies inherited military
apparatuses that were often more powerful than the fledgling states’ other
institutions which might have otherwise controlled them.49
While still quite violent, some view the shift toward civil wars from
interstate ones as a reason for optimism. After all, pre-1945 conquest
seemed sufficient to drag countries into far more destructive conflicts than
the intrastate ones which replaced them.50 In fact, even these internal
conflicts are on the decline, particularly if one focuses on casualties.51 It
seems that although one may have much to fear from one’s countrymen, so
long as that is the only source of conflict, the global trade-off post-WWII
seems like a pretty good deal.

29
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2021

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 14, No. 4

This is misleading for several reasons. First, many of these internal
conflicts have had a substantial international component. Charles Tilly
observed that as the Cold War drew on, great powers increased the degree
to which they intervened in civil wars, seeking to ensure victory for the
sympathetic side.52 Internationalizing civil conflicts in this manner can
serve as an opportunity for enterprising powers—if the victory (or even
survival) of a particular belligerent group would serve the interests of a
potential patron state, then supporting such a belligerent group in such a
conflict can be a way for such a state to enhance their position without
doing any of the fighting.
For example, Mozambique’s Portuguese Frente de Libertação de
Moçambique revolutionaries received arms and training from the Soviet
Union and China in its war against its Portuguese colonial masters.53
While the Angolan Civil War also saw direct intervention on behalf of
three belligerent groups—the incumbent People's Movement for the
Liberation of Angola was reinforced by Cuban troops, the National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola rebels were reinforced with South
African troops, while the National Front for the Liberation of Angola
rebels had support from Zaire’s military—the United States and Soviet
Union also participated in the conflict, seeking to tip the scales without
directly intervening.54 This sort of indirect intervention continues in the
post-Cold War era.55 The Second Congo War, ostensibly an internal
conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, saw the emergence of
belligerent rebel groups backed by both Rwanda and Uganda, with each
country seeking to secure a particular outcome to the conflict by way of
this patronage.56
Second, this supposedly novel trend of internal conflict is older than the
optimists realize. Mohamed Ayoob notes that neorealism’s modern state is
concerned with external threats rather than internal ones out of a lack of
historicity.57 European states prioritized dealing with such threats from
the 16th to the 19th Centuries, when their state building projects were at
similar stages of development as Ayoob argues much of the Third World
stands in the contemporary context, where the majority of post-WWII
conflict takes place. The fact that he observes that these more recent
conflicts are overwhelmingly internal reinforces the point that the postWWII era is not necessarily unique in terms of the prevalence of internal
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threats. For example, the 16th Century’s French Wars of Religion saw the
French state unable to effectively repress French Huguenots.58 Indeed,
Allan Tulchin observes that historians have noted that this failure stems
from the powerlessness of European monarchs relative to contemporary
leaders—and he himself notes the similarity between the interminability of
the conflict and that of contemporary episodic civil wars.59 In short, the
internal threats faced by post-colonial states are anything but new, as are
the potential opportunities for outside powers to intervene without
directly participating in the conflict itself.
In the absence of interstate wars of a type with the World Wars, intrastate
conflict has grown. Rather than serving as a trade-off, intrastate conflict
has become a means by which states can pursue their agendas using the
force of arms without directly participating in the fighting itself. While the
replacement of direct application of force of arms with an indirect method
reached its peak recently, this, too, is not unheard of historically.

Back to the Future: Limited and Hybrid Strategies in the Gray
Zone
This belief that major wars are declining does not mean that conflict—even
armed coercion—is obsolete. Gray zone repertoires allow states to pursue
conflictual aims without necessarily bearing the material or reputational
costs associated with inciting major war. For example, despite seven years
of outcasting, Russia continues to occupy Eastern Ukraine and Crimea.
Absent a dramatic shift from the current situation, there is little to suggest
that it will. This development recasts Hathaway and Shapiro’s argument
into a far more pessimistic framing. Russia, in offering historical and
humanitarian reasons for annexing Crimea,60 may be in the process of
creating blurry lines of sovereignty to facilitate absorbing the region into
Russia proper. They may be able to do this even though other states are
dubious of their claims—international incredulity at American claims that
the invasion of Iraq was justified under the norm of responsibility to
protect did little to dissuade Russia from using that same norm when
justifying its intervention in South Ossetia.61 Moreover, Russia is not the
only actor engaging in this kind of acquisition.
Far from being a new development unique to the 21st Century, territorial
faits accomplis represent the most common form of territorial conquest
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since 1945.62 As such, sporadic faits accomplis imposed by Russia in
central Asia and Eastern Europe, continuous if gradual faits accomplis
from China in the South China Sea, and ongoing fears of future seizures of
the Baltic states and Taiwan are instances of reversion to centuries-old
limited engagement strategies that leverage fog and friction to confuse and
paralyze adversaries. Worse for actors attached to 20th century paradigms
of interstate conflict, they suggest that this trend shows no sign of abating
soon. Rather than demonstrating an end to interstate use of force, these
trends demonstrate a shift in the application of force strategically applied
to gain incremental relative advantages at minimal cost.

Conclusion
Although gray zone hostilities may not carry war’s body count, neither
scholars nor practitioners should mistake the absence of the latter for
peace or, indeed, the absence of conflict.63 Practitioners of statecraft and
warfare are right in their assessment that the lines between conflict and
cooperation are growing increasingly blurry. Although this trend has
corresponded with a decline in major war, academics have by-and-large
incorrectly read this trend as a decrease in interstate conflict. Instead, the
reemergence of shades of gray to conflict highlight the need for more
further study into the various incarnations of limited engagement
strategies, their strategic logic, and their ability to harness fog and friction
in means both novel and time-tested. This article has laid the groundwork
for further exploration of these means by suggesting a general strategic
logic, illustrated in several instances of limited gray zone strategies.
Further work could branch in several directions, from formalized
explorations of strategic bargaining in the gray zone to reevaluations of
canonical just war standards of just cause, proportionality, and last resort.
War continues to be the pursuit of policy by other means, though the
boundaries between conflict and cooperation are, again, troublingly
blurry, with consequences for both practitioners’ formation of strategy and
academics’ approach to understanding interstate conflict and cooperation.
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